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In this article, I deal with Searle’s philosophy of society, the last step to complete his philosophical system. 
This step, however, requires acknowledging the context and presuppositions, or default positions, that 
make possible key concept of this new branch of philosophy. In the first section, I address what the 
enlightenment vision implies. The second section focuses upon how consciousness and intentionality are 
biological tools that help us create and maintain the social world. In the third section, I explain the 
importance of the difference between subjectivity and objectivity. Finally, in the fourth section I elaborate 
upon the default positions: the existence of one world, truth as correspondence to facts, direct perception, 
meaning, and causation. Importantly, I show how the context and presuppositions of the philosophy of 
society are an opportunity of interdisciplinary work between philosophy and the social sciences.  
 




The Construction of the Social Reality strongly influenced, as few books have, the contemporary 
philosophers. As such, it declares that, pace the constructivists, “the world exists independently of our 
representations of it” (Searle 1995:177). This means that the world is one but metaphysically very complex. 
Such complexity is reflected in the fact that, besides atoms, protons, viruses, galaxies, and so on, 
marriages, money, cocktail parties, presidents, and so on exist. The fact that the world is composed of 
particles, systems of particles, and what Searle calls “institutional facts” (Searle 1995:2) makes some 
people solve the metaphysical complexity of the world by claiming that two or three worlds exist. This 
amounts to more complexity, as more worlds and their relation need to be explained. Accordingly, Searle 
counters any form of strong constructivism, arguing that the mode of existence of the social world, for 
example, is caused by brains, which have consciousness and intentionality. 
 
Oddly enough, few researchers of the social sciences have taken interest in Searle’s views, even though 
another book, Making the Social World, systematizes a “philosophy of society” (Searle 2010:5). Even so, 
most people in the social sciences simply neglect Searle’s philosophy, although it can be regarded as a 
whole system that integrates different aspects of reality, such as cognition, society, the role of the human 
being and, certainly, the human civilization. In relation to the last topic, it is also interesting that Searle 
claims that the philosophy of society is a branch of philosophy that could be devoted to explaining the 
emergence and the structure of the human civilization. How so? Searle considers what the philosophy of 
society is thus: “[…] in the sense in which there is a separate branch that we now think of as the philosophy 
of language, but which didn’t exist at the time of Kant and Leibniz; so we should think the philosophy of 
society as a separate branch of philosophy” (Searle 1998a:143). 
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Against this background, this paper focuses upon the context and presuppositions that provide the 
foundation of the philosophy of society. Not only do I describe such presuppositions; in addition, I 
systematize them, showing their crucial importance for Searle’s system. In fact, it is possible to show that, 
without the context, and were those presuppositions false, all or one by one, the entire Searlean system 
would collapse; further, there would be no room for the so-called philosophy of society and, certainly, for 
interdisciplinary work between philosophy and the social sciences.  
 
Importantly, Searle’s system depends upon certain key philosophical concepts, which all serve to elucidate 
the structure of the human civilization. Such concepts are the following: “status functions,” “collective 
intentionality,” “deontic powers,” “desire independent reasons for action,” “constitutive rules,” and the 
abovementioned “institutional facts” (Searle 2010:6). As this philosopher argues, language is also a key for 
understanding the emergence of the civilization. I will not discuss in detail such concepts; rather, I will deal 
with the context and presuppositions that make possible and consistent them. That is, I will argue that 
those key concepts would have never been proposed, had not Searle resorted to the context and 
presuppositions I discuss here.  
 
The first part of the context is the so-called “enlightenment vision,” a view according to which “there was 
a long period in the Western civilization when it was assumed that the universe was completely intelligible 
and that we were capable of a systematic understanding of its nature” (Searle 1998b:2). On this view, the 
human being acts, for the most part, in accordance with reason. The second part of the context 
characterizes how consciousness and intentionality are “biological features of the brain, which though 
causally explained,” enable the existence of the human civilization (Searle 1998b:85). Finally, the last part 
of the context shows how “objectivity and subjectivity have been ill interpreted” by most philosophers 
(Searle 1998b:42). The context allows one to comprehend the first presupposition: “there is a world that 
exists independently of us.” The second presupposition is that “our statements are typically true or false 
depending on whether they correspond to how things are”. The third presupposition is “we have direct 
perceptual access to that world.” The fourth is that, for the most part, “words like rabbit or tree typically 
have reasonably clear meanings.” The last presupposition is that “causation is a real relation among things 
and events.” (Searle 1998b:10). All these presuppositions are fundamental to understand Searle’s realism 
and, further, his project to make possible a philosophy of society. 
  
The context, part I: “enlightenment vision” 
 
Major revolutions took place in the seventeenth century. A general view of nature and the human being 
was developed then, leading to major changes as to how science and scientific knowledge should be 
achieved and justified. As Searle puts it, in virtue of the scientific revolutions of the seventeenth until the 
twentieth century, “it was possible for an educated person to believe that he or she could come to know 
important things about how the universe works” (Searle 1998b:1). Given theories such as Copernico’s, 
Newtonian physics, and others such as Darwin’s theory of evolution, “the universe made a kind of sense” 
and, thus, it looked intelligible (Searle 1998b:1). The very project of the encyclopedia, which was carried 
out by Diderot and D’Alambert, shows the optimism about the growth of knowledge, a feature of the 
enlightenment that indeed contrasts, for example, to the middle ages.  
 
Save for Spinoza, an ontological monist and pantheist, in the enlightenment it was believed that God was 
not directly involved in how the universe works. In fact, those who held scientific theories felt that God 
should not play an important role in the growth of scientific knowledge, which made decrease the 
importance of religion. Even so, there were notorious views involving God such as deism, fideism and 
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atheism. Deism holds that reason could prove the existence of God; fideism holds that reason is unfit for 
justifying the existence of God; finally, the atheists denied the appeal to God and supernatural reasons to 
explain nature and society. Despite these exceptions, many scientists of the enlightenment believed that 
the universe seemed harmonious, and scientific laws, which were postulated by them within different 
scientific fields, seemed to be consistent.  
 
The enlightenment gave birth to what Searle calls “enlightenment vision” (Searle 1998b:1). He asserts that, 
according to the enlightenment, there were two parts that complement with each other. On the one hand, 
the universe was taken to be knowable, then, it was intelligible for reason. On the other hand, intellectuals 
believed that it was possible to discover and postulate the laws of nature. As a result, the enlightenment 
vision is quite optimistic in that it supposes that knowledge of the world, which is reflected by scientific 
laws, is possible, and there were no hard-unsolvable problems in that respect. Within this picture of the 
world, most thinkers assumed a role for the human being in the universe, and expectations grew because 
philosophy, and the natural and social sciences could help the human beings improve their lives.  
 
Philosophers of the enlightenment believed that reason could overcome irrationality. Despite the period 
of terror during the French revolution, Kant claims that the enlightenment was a process by which 
humankind may release from its self-incurred immaturity. Undertaking thinking oneself was Kant’s main 
ideal; thus, the human being should employ and rely on their own intellectual capacities to think and act. 
Put simply, intellectuals thought that the human being should exercise their own intellectual powers to 
overcome superstition, myth, prejudice, miracles and irrational forms of authority. It was believed, then, 
that forms of irrationality oppressed the human being, to the degree that people could not act in 
accordance with values such as liberty and equality. 
 
Nevertheless, critics of the enlightenment vision stress the forms of violence associated with the British, 
American and French revolution. It is claimed, for instance, that the enlightenment did not overcome 
forms of irrationality; rather, it paradoxically encouraged them. As Wilson points out, the enlightenment 
favored the view according to which “autonomous individuals can freely choose, or will, their moral life. 
Believing that individuals are everything, rights are trumps, and morality is relative to time and place, such 
thinkers have been led to design laws, practices, and institutions that leave nothing between the state and 
the individual save choices, contacts, and entitlements. Fourth grade children being told how to use 
condoms is only one of the more perverse of the results” (Wilson 1993:244). 
 
Moreover, critics remark that the enlightenment vision, although has public concerns about the “rights of 
man”, neglected rights of women and of non-white people. As Eze puts it, the enlightenment is highly 
ethnocentric because “Race –I shall thus limit my contribution– is not marginal to either Enlightenment’s 
historical self-constitution or conceptual self-understanding. This is obvious once we examine 
Enlightenment’s dominant theories and practices of reason, humanity, culture, and civilization […] But 
what, for Kant, is meant by ‘mankind’ of ‘maturity’? Does this mean all human beings, or just Europeans 
and white humans?” (Eze 2002:281).  
 
Furthermore, “has ‘enlightenment’ meaning as such?” (Fabiani 2011:7). Warts and all, the enlightenment 
vision serves as the basis upon which the philosophy of society can be founded. Contra some thinkers of 
the twentieth century and their pessimism, Searle believes that the human being is for the most part 
rational, independently of the culture, be it western, eastern or another one. The rationale is the following: 
the human being would not live in a world of institutions otherwise, and irrationality would be central if 
goals were irrationally pursued. This makes the Searlean system resemble the Newtonian one, but unlike 
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the latter it mainly focuses upon how in “a world of physical particles in fields of force there can be such 
things as consciousness, intentionality, free will, language, society, ethics, aesthetics, and political 
obligations”? (Searle 2010:1). Thus, reason needs to discover social laws, and sciences such as sociology, 
anthropology, psychology, linguistic, and philosophy should interact rather than compete. Before 
explaining the presuppositions of the philosophy of society, I will provide the second part of the context. 
 
The context, part II: consciousness and intentionality  
 
The mind is a complex phenomenon; it is perplexing in that most theories have difficulties to characterize 
the nature of the mind; in fact, most theories reduce the mind to something else, but that something 
seems to be much simpler than consciousness; hence, the mind’s subjective viewpoint seems to be left 
out. Contemporary philosophers do not agree in relation to what consciousness is, since some believe that 
the mind: i) is part of the natural world (the naturalists and materialists); ii) is different from the natural 
world (the dualists) and iii) exists in a mysterious form (the mysterianists). As Searle puts it, “From the time 
of the ancient Greeks up to the latest computational models of cognition, the entire subject of 
consciousness, and of its relation to the brain, has been something of a mess” (Searle 1997:4). On Searle’s 
view the mind is a real phenomenon, and it should be causally explained in terms of biology itself. That is, 
the essence of the mind, which is consciousness, is like any other biological phenomenon, such as 
digestion, photosynthesis, respiration, and so on.  
 
The mind has two elements that allow the creation of the social world, namely, consciousness and 
intentionality. These are fundamental to grasp in what sense the mind can create and maintain the social 
world. Consciousness is a phenomenon that is present in animals and other highly developed creatures. 
As such, it allows organisms to map the world around us, and to give the ability to know how things are in 
the environment. But how emerged consciousness in “a world that is composed of systems of particles in 
fields of force?” (Searle 1998b:40). 
 
The particles are sometimes organized into systems. The boundaries of the systems are set by causal 
relations, which means that they exist as objects in nature in relation to other systems. Now, certain 
organisms, which are carbon-based, have developed nervous systems. In virtue of them, minds come into 
play. As mentioned above, conscious minds map the environment, and make us know how things are 
around us. Consciousness, which includes all the mental states that provide sentience when awake, has 
an inner character, and is qualitative and subjective.  
 
By the inner character of consciousness, Searle means that this biological phenomenon is related to an 
organism’s inner mental states, “in a very spatial sense” (Searle 1998b:41). The pain I feel is accessed by 
my organism, in a way that it has no access to any other organism. Such states are also qualitative, as no 
objectivity, in quantitative terms, can explain the way conscious mental states exist. Rather, there is a feel 
of a what-it-is-like to have those conscious states. Finally, these are subjective, because they exist, 
according to the first-person ontology, i.e., for a subject who maps the environment. 
 
During the waking hours of our lives, we are in different forms of consciousness. Feeling bored, the taste 
of a wine, the smell of a flower, happiness, sadness, being angry at other drivers, etc. are forms of 
consciousness that are the most important part of our lives. In fact, life would be meaningless, if 
consciousness did not exist, because life itself is related to consciousness. For example, it enables us to 
value life experience, in the sense that no other biological phenomenon does. Did consciousness 
disappear, we would all act as robots without feelings, emotions, experiences. In short, a world without 
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consciousness would not enable us to value our experience, which ontologically depends upon the 
existence of consciousness. 
 
Although some philosophers deny that consciousness has a function, it does. Most human activities such 
as walking, eating, copulating, speaking a language and so on would be meaningless without 
consciousness. Despite this, some philosophers hold that our behavior may be the same without 
consciousness: to advance their arguments, they hold nature constant, and then they imagine that 
consciousness does not exist. They claim, furthermore, that there would be no conscious behavior, but 
the world would be the same. Naturally, this argument supposes without an adequate proof that all the 
activities would necessarily be the same, did not consciousness exist. But that is wrong: there is an 
important difference between “any science fiction we like, and the real world” (Searle 1998b:63). Indeed, 
in the real world we do care for institutions and the constitutive rules, that is, rules that are part of what 
the institutions are.  
 
Intentionality is related to consciousness, in an essential form. Mental causation reflects the way in which 
we act “by representing the events we cause” (Searle 1998b:64). For example, if I desire to drink water, I 
consciously represent the event that will be caused, namely, drinking water. Therefore, there is an 
important link between consciousness and intentionality because the former enables the human being to 
causally produce what is represented, that is, objects, events, and states of affairs. If consciousness did 
not exist, there would not exist mental causation, and the things represented could not be enacted in the 
world. 
 
Now, intentionality is a technical philosophical term: “Intentionality is that feature of certain mental states 
and events that consists in their (in a special sense of these words) being directed at, being about, being 
of, or representing certain other entities and states of affairs” (Searle 1984:3). But, it is important to be 
careful here: the intentional object need not to exist. John’s desire to travel to the Atlantis does not entail 
that the Atlantis really exists. In addition, all intentional states are conscious, which means that 
intentionality must be understood in terms of consciousness. Even though many intentional states are not 
conscious (e.g. John’s belief that Washington was a white man), they can become conscious, and thus they 
are potentially conscious. This feature of intentionality is the key to understanding why it enables the 
human being to relate to the environment, be it physical or social. As Searle remarks, “the primary 
evolutionary role of the mind is to relate us in certain ways to the environment, and especially to other 
people” (Searle 1998b:85). 
 
One important distinction Searle makes about intentionality is that it is intrinsic, derived, or as-if. Intrinsic 
intentionality is the internal property of certain mental states that make them represent things, be them 
existent or not. For example, “John believes it is raining in London” is about John’s belief about the weather 
conditions in London, which is not observer-dependent: John’s mental state has the property 
independently of what can be observed. By contrast, derived intentionality is not internal to anything, but 
derived from the intentionality of the intrinsic mental states of agents (e.g. maps). Incidentally, it is 
observer-dependent: “Es regnet means it is raining in German”, which derives its intentionality from the 
mental states of agents. Finally, the as-if intentionality is only metaphorical: when I assert that the ATM 
believes that my pin number is incorrect, it is only a metaphor about what is going on with a machine.  
 
In addition, intentional states have direction of fit and conditions of satisfaction. The direction of fit 
consists in the way intentional states refer to; for example, a belief about the moon has the direction mind-
to-world, because the mind needs to adjust, or it does not, to how the world is. Likewise, a desire may 
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have a direction of fit world-to-mind: something must occur in the world to fulfil a desire. Certain 
intentional states have null direction of fit: being happy because you earned the lottery implies that the 
mind need not adjust to the world, nor the world needs to adjust to the mind.  
 
Conditions of satisfaction, on the other hand, are what needs to be satisfied for the propositional content 
(the proposition to be believed, for example), if the belief is true (for instance, it needs to rain to make the 
belief “it’s raining” true). In the case of desires, and similar intentional states, the world needs to change 
if the conditions of satisfaction are to be satisfied. Thus, these intentional states fulfil certain conditions 
instead of making beliefs true. Conditions of satisfaction are fulfilled, then, when the propositional content 
match the reality represented. 
 
Importantly, intentional states do not come in isolation; on the contrary, they appear in a network of other 
intentional states. For example, the belief that “It’s raining” is connected to a desire “I desire to get my 
umbrella”. In addition, the belief that “having the flu is nasty” is connected to my desire to get the 
umbrella. All beliefs, desires, hopes, and other intentional states appear in what Searle calls the network. 
If a belief did not connect to other intentional states, they would be meaningless because one would not 
be able to answer why, how, in what sense one has an intentional mental state. As a result, intentionality 
is holistic, for the network has infinite beliefs, desires and other mental states that are connected. 
 
Finally, intentionality would not exist, did a background of preintentional states not existed. By 
“background” Searle means capacities, abilities, know-how, and taken for granted presuppositions that 
make possible the existence of intentional states. As Negru points out: “The Background is not the 
consequence of the transcendental relationship between the subject and the world, as phenomenology 
considers, but it is the condition of possibility of man’s representing the social and biological world. Its 
content is given, on the one hand, by the capacities all people share, as biological beings that belong to 
the same species (i.e., deep Background). On the other hand, its content is given by the local cultural 
practices influencing the individual as a member of a certain society (i.e., local Background)” (Negru 
2013:30). 
 
The desire to walk requires background presuppositions that makes the action possible: we presuppose 
gravity, going forward, and so on. The belief that it is impossible that A≠A presupposes the principle of 
contradiction. While the former background is deep, the latter seems to be local or cultural. As I will 
examine later, that the world exists, truth as correspondence between statements and facts, perception 
as direct access to the world, meaning as somehow clear, and causation as the way we relate events are 
part of the background, and for this reason Searle names them the “default positions.” However, to 
understand such positions the last part of the context needs to be examined.  
 
The context, part III: subjectivity vs. objectivity 
 
Neither subjectivity nor objectivity has been topics that make people reach a consensus in philosophy. The 
former, for example, has been related to issues such as the nature of beauty, because this property seems 
to require that perceivers declare that something is beautiful. For this reason, some people have analyzed 
beauty in terms of subjectivity; by contrast, other people believe that there is beauty in things themselves, 
and thus consider that beauty is an objective property. A perfect rose, for instance, is believed by some 
philosophers to be beautiful, independently of what is perceived, or of the representations. Furthermore, 
the moral beauty view has been associated to the thesis that “moral virtue is beautiful and moral vice is 
ugly” (Paris 2017:1). This explains why considerations about beauty are controversial, like those of taste. 
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Unlike beauty, taste is taken to be merely subjective; the expression de gustibus non est disputandum 
clarifies in what sense taste is subjective. Is objectivity as controversial as subjectivity?  
 
Objectivity is not only related to issues such as beauty, but also to scientific judgements. Objectivity is 
often taken to be a characteristic of scientific claims, and thus is identified with the role that science plays 
in society. Think, for example, about a trial in which a murderer is being investigated. If certain evidence, 
such as DNA samples, were discovered and matched the DNA of the accused, her identification would be 
taken to be objective, and a sentence could be imposed. Indeed, scientific evidence is most of the time 
considered to be objective, in that no values or preferences play a role. Of course, this is controversial, 
since automatic discrimination exists, and is difficult to avoid. As Tetlock and Mitchell remark “no one 
knows what types of accountability structures are essential for preventing implicit prejudice, variously 
defined, from translating into discrimination, variously defined” (Tetlock and Mitchell 2008:14). Thus, 
subjective judgements are made due to different factors, and objectivity seems to be more an ideal, a 
must do, rather than something easy to achieve.  
 
Offering a philosophical account of subjectivity and objectivity, Searle distinguishes an epistemic and an 
ontological side of both concepts. When talking about epistemology, “subjective” is related to judgements 
that are made in virtue of preferences and values. For example, judging that the Statue of Liberty is more 
beautiful than the Tour Eiffel is subjective, because such an appraisal is in function of certain preferences 
or values. Some people, in fact, prefer New York over Paris when it comes down to beauty. Others believe 
that Paris is more beautiful than London. All those judgements are subjective, and they even be related to 
certain social status. As two sociologists remark: “Beauty (and its opposite) often functions as a status cue; 
that is, when it activates patterns of widely shared cultural beliefs it is a status characteristic just as race 
and sex are” (Webster and Driskell 1983:140).  
 
Despite the role of culture and prejudices, Searle claims that not distinguishing between epistemic 
subjectivity vs. metaphysical subjectivity, and epistemic objectivity vs. metaphysical objectivity has led 
people to deny that the mind can be studied objectively. The confusion most people have is the following: 
they take the mind to be subjective (in the epistemic sense) and conclude that it cannot be objectively 
examined. Such a conclusion is wrong, for Searle holds that the mind has subjective existence, and this 
does not prevent us from making objective judgements, in scientific terms, about it. As already examined, 
the causal explanation of the mind does not prevent us from understanding its subjectivity. 
 
In short, Searle’s distinction of what is subjective, and what is objective is also well connected with another 
one, namely, truth as correspondence, which is also at the core of Searle’s realism. Indeed, denying that 
statements correspond to facts would not only undermine his realism, but also the sense of objectivity I 
have examined here. 
 
Searle’s presuppositions of the philosophy of society 
 
Default position I: the one and only world 
 
On Searle’s view, there is only one world. In that world atoms, molecules, viruses, mountains, tectonic 
plates, planets, galaxies, etc., exist. Msimang emphasizes Searle’s point as follows: “he takes for granted a 
particular kind of naturalism that is contained within his notion of the basic facts […] Whatever the basic 
facts are that constitute the world, it is presumed that social reality is installed upon them” (Msimang 
2014:173). In view of this naturalism, terms of physical objects refer independently of our observations, 
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and furthermore, of preferences or values. While the Fuji mountain exists independently of geography and 
geographers, and of the knowledge about that object, the Minotaur only exists in our minds. In fact, to 
describe the meaning of “Minotaur,” the context of a fictional story is required, that is, we need to resort 
to imagination. The relation between fiction and imagination is not trivial at all: as explained in the 
introduction, a whole intellectual movement holds that physics is constructed in the social world. In fact, 
advocates of constructivism claim that no metaphysical difference exists between Minotaur and the Fuji 
mountain. But this cannot be right: Minotaur and the Fuji mountain are indeed different. While the former 
existence has been collectively imagined, the latter requires no imagination at all; in fact, if the humankind 
disappeared the Fuji mountain would exist anyway. It is related, then, to a basic fact.  
Searle firmly argues against any form of constructivism and of idealism, but for practical reasons: “you 
have to take it for granted that there is a way that things really are” (Searle 1998b:32). Even though there 
is only one world, all physical objects and social objects belong to this only world. The world of physical 
objects is also the world to which scientific terms refer to. For instance, “water” refers to certain molecules 
that do not depend for their existence on our minds. In contrast, marriages depend on intentional agents 
to exist, but they do exist. Accordingly, Searle claims that the social cannot be over the physical, and nor 
is the latter only fiction, although we resort to our minds and imagination to create and maintain money, 
marriages, football games and cocktail parties. In short, social objects belong to the world of particles and 
systems of particles, but their existence fundamentally depends on our minds. 
 
Searle’s philosophy is a form of realism that accepts the existence of collectively imagined represented 
objects but denies that physical objects only depend on our minds. This form of realism, which I will explain 
further below, has an advantage to counter anti-realism: it allows the explanation of social objects as 
collective creations of minds, and thus they are dependent upon what Searle dubs collective intentionality. 
Pace wives, marriages are socially constructed in this very sense because their existence requires that 
husbands believe that they are married too. But, unlike in fiction, a declaration and a collective 
commitment are necessary for the existence of marriages; they would merely be fictitious social relations 
otherwise. 
 
Based on the metaphysical status of objects, Searle distinguishes between brute facts and institutional 
facts. When an earthquake hits the coasts of California, a major movement with the tectonic plates has 
occurred, and that very event exists independently of what we believe. In contrast, when Mary holds that 
she is married to John, both are married because an official has declared their social status, and we all 
recognize, collectively, that such a marriage exists (a constitutive rule of the form “X counts as Y in context 
C” is recognized, incidentally). I will return to this issue below.  
 
Institutions are constructed, but they do not depend on preferences or values. On the contrary, institutions 
are objective in the sense that institutional facts, which are associated with institutions, exist 
independently of what we prefer or value. Money is certainly another paradigmatic example of an 
institution because it illustrates how functions are collectively assigned to objects that have intrinsic 
properties. These are contingent regarding what the object is. As to the creation of institutions, Searle 
presents the paradigmatic example of a tribe that builds a wall around its territory thus: “Consider for 
example a primitive tribe that initially builds a wall around its territory. The wall is an instance of a function 
imposed in virtue of sheer physics: the wall, we will suppose, is big enough to keep intruders out and the 
members of the tribe in. But suppose the wall gradually evolves from being a physical barrier to being a 
symbolic barrier. Imagine that the wall decays so that the only thing left is a line of stones. But imagine 
that the inhabitants and their neighbors continue to recognize the line of stones as marking a boundary of 
the territory in such a way that it affects their behavior. For example, the inhabitants only cross the 
González, R. 2018. On the context and presuppositions of Searle’s philosophy of society 
Cinta moebio 62: 231-245 
doi: 10.4067/S0717-554X2018000200231  
 
 239 
boundary under special conditions, and outsiders can only cross the territory if it is acceptable to the 
inhabitants. The line of stones now has a function that is not performed in virtue of sheer physics but in 
virtue of collective intentionality” (Searle 1995:39, emphasis in original). 
 
For this reason, Searle claims that the social world has a subjective ontology (mode of existence), like 
consciousness. But there is an important difference: social objects and events exist in virtue of the agents’ 
collective intentionality, and thus they are related to certain recognized constitutive rules. As I will analyze 
below, money is also ontologically subjective, but the fact that one dollar gives rights in virtue of 
constitutive rules is epistemologically objective. In short, there is only one world, but objects vary their 
mode of existence in it. 
 
Default position II: truth as correspondence to facts 
 
Facts are primary when it comes to truth and correspondence. It is worth noting that truth as 
correspondence implies that what we believe or say is true if it corresponds to the facts. Analytic 
philosophy has embraced this thesis, that is, true statements correspond to facts. For instance, if I say: “It 
is raining”, such a statement needs to correspond to the actual weather conditions. If it is sunny, then the 
statement is false, whereas if it is raining, the statement is true. Consequently, the correspondence theory 
of truth puts all the emphasis on the statements, and whether these correspond to the facts. 
 
An antecedent of the correspondence theory is the identity theory of truth, which was advanced by Moore 
and Russell in the early 20th century. According to this theory, a true proposition is identical to a fact. As 
such, propositions are believed, and they must be understood as objects of beliefs and other propositional 
attitudes. Thus, propositions, which are the content of beliefs and propositional attitudes, are the bearers 
of truth. In this sense, truth is a property of propositions, which involves that such a property is 
unanalyzable: it cannot be defined by any other property. As Glanzberg remarks: “Moore and Russell came 
to reject the identity theory of truth in favor of the correspondence theory, sometime around 1910 […] 
They do so because they came to reject the existence of propositions. Why? Among reasons, they came 
to doubt that there could be any such things as false propositions, and then concluded that there are no 
things as propositions at all” (Glanzberg 2016:3). 
 
Put simply, Moore and Russell denied the possibility that false propositions could correspond to false facts. 
How facts could be false at all? This problem led Moore and Russell to abandon the identity theory of 
truth. As the issue of the constituents of a statement was problematic, because the unity of a proposition 
was also problematic, they held the following thesis: instead of propositions, the bearers of truth are 
beliefs themselves. An ontological thesis was advanced then, namely, a belief is true if there exists a fact 
to which it corresponds. 
 
On this view, it is also assumed that facts are entities. Facts are composed of particles, properties and 
relations or universals. The correspondence theory needs the metaphysical thesis about facts, because it 
would make no sense otherwise. Facts are primitives, as they are truisms, they merely exist. For example, 
a fact that John is brushing his teeth corresponds to a fact: <John, brushing teeth>, in which an individual 
has the property of being brushing his teeth. By contrast, the world does not include the fact <John, 
singing>, in case John is brushing his teeth.  
 
Propositions have a structure that corresponds to the structure of sentences, and the correspondence 
theory of truth holds that there is correspondence when the proposition and the fact have the same 
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structure, and the same constituents. If there is no match, the proposition is simply false. Propositions, 
which are the contents of a belief, mirror reality, by corresponding to the right pieces of reality. In 
summary, the world provides with certain structured entities that explain truth. Such entities involve a 
metaphysics according to which the nature of truth is in function of the structured entities, the 
propositions and the beliefs. Why Searle would endorse such a theory?  
 
As described above, Searle embraces the enlightenment vision, that is, the view according to which the 
universe exists independently of our minds, and our cognitive tools are sufficient to make us comprehend 
its nature. Further, and as explained above, Searle distinguishes the epistemological issues (how we come 
to know) from the metaphysical ones (what exists). For example, when discussing Gödel´s proof, this 
philosopher asserts that “truth is a matter of correspondence to the facts. If a statement is true, there 
must be some fact in virtue of which it is true. The facts are a matter of what exists, of ontology” (Searle 
1998b:5). Thus, Gödel´s proof only shows that mathematical truth is not to be identified with provability. 
By concluding this, Searle insists on the enlightenment vision, and how he wants to contribute to it. 
 
It is worth noting that a popular alternative to the correspondence theory is the coherence theory. 
According to this alternative theory, it is not the world that provide facts to which propositions are 
contrasted. Instead, beliefs exist in a system of other beliefs, and thus they cohere with them if the belief 
is true. Since most advocates of the coherence theory are idealists, the world is composed of a system of 
beliefs, and only then a belief can be true, if and only if such a belief is consistent in a system of other 
beliefs. Glanzberg explains this point as follows: “if there is nothing to truth beyond what is to be found in 
an appropriate system of beliefs, then it would seem one’s beliefs constitute the world in a way that 
amounts to idealism” (Glanzberg 2016:6). 
 
Most advocates of the correspondence theory are realists, like Searle. Naturally, the theory of 
correspondence to facts is one of the so-called “default positions.” Again, default positions are the views 
that we hold prerefectively “so that any departure from them requires a conscious effort and convincing 
argument” (Searle 1998b:9). In the case of truth, we simply tend to presuppose that beliefs (and their 
propositions) correspond to facts in the world. And, as examined above, such facts, which belong to the 
one and only world, are either brute or institutional. Therefore, denying the correspondence theory 
completely blurs such a distinction. However, another way to undermine Searle’s realism is to counter the 
direct access theory of perception. 
 
Default position III: perception  
 
Perception is intentional, that is, it involves an intentional mental state; moreover, perception is the most 
important way by which we relate to the environment. Investigating the conceptual story that explains 
how “x looks at y” (x being a subject and y a perceptual object), Searle focuses on the visual experience of 
“looking at an object” (Searle 1983:37). The visual experience consists in looking at the object, but looked 
or perceived properties do not pertain to the experience; instead, they are part of the object itself. For 
example, if I look at John parking his blue Ford mustang, my experience is not blue, nor does it have the 
shape of a mustang. The car itself has such properties. Shape, color and other properties are accessible 
through vision, but the visual experience is caused by the object itself. But, one may object that, if I were 
hallucinating, what would my experience be of? 
 
In this situation, one would indeed have an experience, but there would be no reference for it, since one 
would appear to be seeing an object when in fact one sees nothing. When a hallucination of a car is 
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induced, one sees nothing and yet has an experience which is exactly indistinguishable from the 
experience of looking at a real car (this is precisely why hallucinations look so real; their conditions of 
satisfaction are not fulfilled, and the experiences are at fault, not the world).  
 
Visual experiences have conditions of satisfaction like beliefs and desires; as such, it is difficult to separate 
the intentional object from the intentional state. One may not separate the visual experience from being 
an experience of and a belief from being a belief about. But, again, neither a visual experience nor a belief 
requires the existence of the intentional object. As perceptions are intentional, they also have internal 
conditions of satisfaction. One must know what has to be the case in order that the experience of looking 
be correct (like knowing what has to occur in order that the belief be true), which is a trivial consequence 
of the fact that the intentional content determines the conditions of satisfaction, and the fact that, in the 
case of perceptual experiences and beliefs/desires, the content is a whole proposition, that is, such content 
represents an object or a state of affairs. As a result, the important thing to bear in mind is that the 
conditions of satisfaction can be satisfied, but this does not entail that the content of an experience 
necessarily exists.  
 
Nonetheless, there are some important differences between common intentional states and perception. 
First of all, my visual experience of John’s blue Ford mustang is not a representation, but a presentation, 
because it is a direct experience of an object. Experiences have directedness and immediacy, and reporting 
their occurrence consists in stating the existence of a state of affairs. Secondly, unlike beliefs and desires, 
which need not be conscious, visual experiences require consciousness (for example, the following report 
entails that Mary is conscious, if true: Mary looks at John flirting with Sue). Thirdly, unlike ordinary 
intentional states, visual experiences implement a particular relation with their conditions of satisfaction, 
namely, some of them are utterly necessary for the causal production of the visual experience. If one looks 
at John’s car, the conditions of satisfaction of that intentional state cause one’s visual experience, because 
the intentional content of the visual experience determines what has to occur in order that one’s 
experience be veridical. For this reason, Searle says that perceptions have self-referential contents, that is, 
they figure in their own conditions of satisfaction. One part of the conditions of satisfaction is satisfied by 
the existence of the intentional object, and another part is satisfied when the content of the visual 
experience is caused by what is seen. 
 
It should be carefully noted that Searle favors a naïve realist account of direct perception. While both 
representationalism and phenomenalism, two classical theories about the nature of perception, hold that 
the visual experience is the object of visual perception and, then, that what is seen is an impression or 
sense datum, Searle asserts that: “We see material objects and other objects and states of affairs in the 
world, at least much of the time; and in the hallucination cases we don’t see anything, though we do 
indeed have visual experiences in both cases” (Searle 1983:58, emphasis in original). 
 
On Searle’s direct account of perception, the intentional content is the object toward which one’s visual 
perception is directed. This means that perception is a taken for granted presupposition, or a default 
position that enables one to relate to the environment, if the conditions of satisfaction of perception are 
satisfied.  
 
Default position IV: meaning 
 
The last century had a good deal of philosophical debate about meaning. Several philosophers hold that 
the meaning of expressions corresponds to certain facts. However, a prominent tradition in the philosophy 
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of language denies that there are facts about the meanings of linguistic expressions. Quine’s famous 
gavagai thought experiment is paradigmatic in this regard: if linguists had to translate this expression from 
a totally unknown language into English, in the presence of a rabbit and an aborigine native speaker who 
utters gavagai, some would immediately translate this as rabbit, but this translation would not be accurate 
at all: it could mean “soup”, “stew”, “bad luck”, “good luck” and so on. N view of this thought experiment, 
it is not clear whether meanings correspond to facts, because the “empirical” evidence is not conclusive 
at all. For, what would be the intention of the native speaker who utters gavagai? 
 
Against this background, Searle adopts a viewpoint according to which “words like, rabbit or tree typically 
have reasonably clear meanings” (Searle 1998b:10, emphasis in original). Further, such in default positions 
II and III, he holds that meaning is a presupposition, or a default position. In particular, the meaning of 
meaning needs to be examined in linguistic terms, that is, the property of meaning in terms and sentences, 
on the one hand, and of the speaker’s intentions, on the other. A distinction should be made then: 
between the sense of sentences or of expressions, and of speaker meaning or utterance meaning. While 
sentences and expressions have meanings as part of a language, and thus they depend upon the meaning 
of words and their syntactical arrangement, speaker or utterance meaning is in function of the speaker’s 
intentions. As such, then, sentence meaning is part of the conventions of a language; by contrast, speaker 
meaning is related to what thoughts a speaker intends to communicate. Searle considers that speaker 
meaning is the primary notion of meaning because language is a tool to communicate intentional states. 
Therefore, when addressing meaning, Searle mainly focuses upon speaker meaning. 
 
He phrases his concern about meaning with the following question: “How is it that speakers can impose 
meaning on mere sounds made from their mouths or on marks made on a paper?” (Searle 1998b:140). In 
view of this problem, Searle advances his main thesis, namely, meaning is a form of derived intentionality, 
that is, the original intrinsic intentionality of a speaker’s intentional state is transferred to words, 
sentences, terms, etc., which involves that the original intentionality of thought is imposed on symbols. 
Upon this basis, the speakers perform speech acts, that is, the imposition of intentionality on those 
symbols. The performance of an intentional act, such as an utterance, and the production of sounds, is 
part of the conditions of satisfaction of an intention to make an utterance.  
 
When making an utterance one imposes conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction. For 
example, if a German speaker utters “Es regnet”, conditions of satisfaction of the sentence are part of the 
complex intention she had. Nevertheless, as she meant that it is raining, the utterance acquires conditions 
of satisfaction on its own; in other words, the utterance will be satisfied if and only if it is raining. The last 
conditions are the truth conditions of the utterance, and as such it will be true if it is raining and false 
otherwise. There are two parts, then, in her intention: the intention to make the utterance, and the 
intention that the utterance has certain conditions of satisfaction. Moreover, there are a third set of 
conditions of satisfaction, namely, the communicative ones. The speaker intends that the hearer 
understands, and thus the utterance has been made intentionally and the sentence has certain truth 
conditions. 
 
Conditions of satisfaction are, then, what really matter when examining meaning. As Searle emphasizes, 
if he were practicing the German pronunciation in the shower, and said “Es regnet, es regnet, es regnet”, 
he would say but not mean that it is raining. In this case, the conditions of satisfaction are quite different 
because an utterance would be made, but no intention to mean would exist. But, what are the conditions 
of satisfaction when I utter “Es regnet” and I really mean it? Well, I must have the meaning intention, while 
making the utterance, and say it sincerely. The key to understanding this is, again, the existence of 
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conditions of satisfaction in intentional states. Then, according to Searle, the meaning intention is the 
intention that the utterance has additional conditions of satisfaction. He emphasizes the point as follows: 
“since the utterance is itself the condition of satisfaction of the intention to make the utterance, the 
meaning intention amounts to the intention that the conditions of satisfaction, that is, in this case, truth 
conditions. What I intend when I say, ‘Es regnet,’ and mean it, is that my utterance ‘Es regnet’ should have 
truth conditions –and thus, when I say and mean it, I am committed to its truth. This point holds whether 
I am lying or not. Both the liar and the truth teller make a commitment to tell the truth. The difference is 
that the liar is not keeping his commitment” (Searle 1998b:143). 
 
Therefore, there are at least two sets of conditions of satisfaction: those of the intention to utter, and 
those of the utterance itself. When I say and mean it “Es regnet”, I am committed to the truth of the 
utterance. Now, the intention to communicate meaningfully in words should not be confused with the 
intention to communicate meaning to a hearer: the former aims at the conditions of satisfaction that 
acquire the utterance, or meaning intention, whereas the latter is communication intention: the aim to 
produce understanding in people by making them recognize what we are trying to say.  
 
In communication one succeeds when one makes people recognize what I am trying to tell them. In this 
case, understanding is the grasp of meaning, for example, if I utter “Es regnet”. In short, communication 
intention boils down to making people recognize that I have uttered a sentence to make them understand 
what I meant. If this happens, the hearer knows the language, recognizes my intention to utter a sentence 
of the language, and recognizes that I mean what I say. Only then I will have succeeded in communicating 
her, for example, that it is raining. This is meaning, according to Searle: we presuppose that mental states 
enable communication, and the understanding of thoughts occurs by means of language.  
 
Default position V: causation 
 
Hume holds that causation does not exist, because it is only the way in which we habitually conjunct events 
in the world. Searle counters this view by holding that causation is “a real relation among things and 
events” (Searle 1998b:10). Moreover, he supposes that to characterize causation properly we must stick 
to the facts, and these show that the standard model of causation begins at early stages, when the child 
learns that one object may exert physical pressure on another. This concept of causation, which Searle 
describes as Piaget’s model of causation, leads to mistakes like epiphenomenalism, or the view that holds 
that consciousness is a residue that causes nothing in the world. Therefore, the “push-pull” or billiard ball 
concept of causation leads to the denial that consciousness plays an important role in explaining complex 
human behavior, which range from one’s arm moving to the factors that caused inflation, economic 
depression, or a war. 
 
Piaget’s model of causation is wrong, according to Searle. This is so because, as we learn more about how 
the world works, we need to acquire other concepts of causation, those that enable one to explain 
complex social phenomena. After we move from the push-pull concept, we become capable of explaining 
a wide range of causes. As Searle emphasizes: “Causation, in short, is not a matter of pushing and pulling, 
it is a matter of something being responsible for something else happening […] Suppose we start with the 
fact that the mind affects the body and the body affects the mind, and go from there. That is, let us assume 
at the start what we all know from our own experience that there are causal relations between 
consciousness and other physical events. For example, when I consciously intend to raise my arm, my 
conscious state causes my arm to go up; when I bump into a solid object, the impact of the object causes 
me to feel a sensation of pain. Let us start, at least provisionally, with the acceptance of these facts and 
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then redraw the conceptual map so that it accurately reflects them” (Searle 1998b:59, emphasis in 
original).  
 
Science is a good example of how the concept of causation needs to be broadened. Today we think of 
fields of force to explain gravitation, for example. Nobody thinks that there must be strings connecting 
one object to another to explain gravitational attraction. Given what we know in history, sociology, 
psychology, anthropology, linguistics and other scientific disciplines, we should broaden the scope of 
causality. Only then there is room to include mind-body and mind-to the world causation. But, what if we 
remain sceptical and deny the existence of causation? 
 
As explained above, we would need a philosophical argument, a very complex one, to deny the facts, and 
especially the experience of the mental and other types of causation. That will not do, because there are 
different levels of causation, and we presuppose that mental causation exists to elucidate the complexity 
of the world, be it physical or social. In fact, levels of causation are crucial to grasp the working of a gasoline 
engine, according to Searle: at one level, we talk about the cylinders and pistons. At a different lower level, 
we describe the passage of electrons across the electrodes, the oxidation of the hydrocarbons, the 
formation of new compounds, and so on. Which level is the right one? Both levels. The same goes for the 
mind: we explain the feeling of thirst at a brain level, but this one allows the conscious behavior that makes 
us understand why we need to quench our thirst.  
 
Briefly put, in nature there is a low level of description, i.e. physics, but such a level does not prevent us 
from accepting a higher level, like in the social world. The causation presupposition is fundamental to 
understand why interdisciplinary work in sciences needs to be favored. If we reduce everything to a basic 
level of explanation, we leave out crucial parts of how the world works. That is, both the basic and the 




Searle’s philosophical system explains the world. However, three parts of context are needed to 
understand the last step of that system, the philosophy of society: the enlightenment vision, consciousness 
and intentionality, and subjectivity and objectivity. Such parts allow us to grasp better not only the default 
positions, but also the basic key concepts that are part of the philosophy of society. In a world of systems 
of particles and fields of force, we presuppose the existence of a world, truth as correspondence to facts, 
direct perception, clear meanings, and causation. But, what if we consciously abandoned such 
presuppositions? That is, what if we remained sceptical about the different levels of explanation of 
complex social and mental phenomena? 
 
Even if we advanced complex philosophical arguments to do so, we would still act based on such 
presuppositions, i.e., from a practical viewpoint we would stick to the default positions anyway. But there 
is an extra: once accepting the existence of the presuppositions or default positions, one can make room 
for interdisciplinary work to explain the structure of the human civilization. Indeed, philosophy is necessary 
to grasp phenomena such as consciousness and intentionality, which allow us to move to higher levels of 
explanation. But other sciences such as sociology, anthropology, psychology, etc., can explain complex 
phenomena in terms of high levels of explanation. 
 
What I have tried to accomplish here is an elucidation of the default positions and the key concepts related 
to the social world. To wit, I have systematized the ways in which we do cope with the world, which is only 
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one, despite its complexity. Searle’s system, then, is an invitation to interdisciplinary work between 
philosophy and the social sciences. But, such an opportunity is “up for grabs” if and only if we move on 
from certain philosophical prejudices to a sort of interdisciplinarity that encourages cooperation instead 
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